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OVER-ACCOUNTABLE ACCOUNTANTS? A PROPOSAL
FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES
STEMMING FROM THE AUDIT FUNCTION
GEOFFREY T. CHALMERS*
The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be
obeyed ....' -Benjamin Cardozo
With the issuance of the Trueblood Committee Report in October
1973, the accounting profession began a new period of examining the
objectives of financial statements.2 Recognizing that a review of
guidelines to improve accounting and financial reporting must
begin with a clear understanding of objectives, this report noted:
"An objective of financial statements is to serve primarily those
users who have limited authority, ability or resources to obtain in-
formation and who rely on financial statements as their principal
source of information about an enterprise's economic activities. '3
Financial statements purport to enable these users to evaluate a
business on the basis of information about such matters as cash
flow, enterprise earning power, and management's ability to utilize
enterprise resources.' In this regard, the report noted several criti-
cisms leveled against the practices of financial accounting, includ-
ing concentration on reporting historical events rather than predic-
tions, emphasis on values derived from exchange transactions rather
than current valuation, use of different accounting methods to de-
scribe similar transactions, and generally excessive concentration
on the appearance of regularity rather than economic substance.5
The Trueblood Report was, of course, but one development in the
accounting profession's recent effort to meet these and other criti-
cisms of published financial statements; these criticisms also have
generated an increasing amount of litigation.'
* B.A., Harvard University; LL.B., Columbia Law School; M.B.A., New York University.
Corporate Counsel, Continental Investment Corporation, Boston.
1. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).
2. See Smny GRoup oN THE Omarsvns OF FmANkIAL STATEMENTS, AICPA, OBEacrvas OF
FINANCIAL STATMENTS (1973). [hereinafter cited as TRU ELOOD REPORT]. See also Armstrong,
The Work and Workings of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 29 Bus. LAw. 145,
145.46 (1974); Financial Accounting Standards Board, Conceptual Framework for Accounting
and Reporting, June 6, 1974 (discussion memorandum).
3. TnUEBLOOD REPORT 17.
4. Id. at 62-63.
5. Id. at 15-16.
6. For a summary of the essential liability developments, see Gormley, Accountants' Pro-
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To analyze the legal liabilities of auditors, several questions must
be considered. Of initial importance is the process involved when
independent public accountants prepare reports on published finan-
cial statements as auditors. Does their liability flow from what they
say they do or from what the public, the courts, or the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) thinks they do - or should do? Can
the objectives and criticisms cited in the Trueblood Report be met
solely by looking at the form and content of published financial
statements?7 Or does the profession need, as well, an overhaul of the
legal consequences of its relationship to those statements as inde-
pendent auditors?8 This Article will examine these questions and
propose some amendments to the federal securities laws that may
help the profession attain the objectives and overcome the criticisms
set forth in the Trueblood Report.
THE REPORTING PROCESS
What does an independent auditor actually undertake when he
performs the audit and attest functions? The rules of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) provide that the
auditor is to examine the client's books, records, and properties, and
report on the client's financial statements, all in accordance with
"generally accepted auditing standards." Besides matters of pro-
fessionalism, independence, evaluation of the client's internal con-
fessional Liability - A Ten-Year Review, 29 Bus. LAw. 1205 (1974). For a review of the
accounting issues, see A. BRaLOFF, UNACCOUNTAsLE AccOUNTING (1972); Kleckner, Disclosure
is the Weak Spot in Audits, Bus. WEEK, June 30, 1973, at 12; FORBES, May 15, 1967, at 28.
See also Wheat, The SEC, The Financial Accounting Standards Board and The Accounting
Profession, 29 Bus. LAw. 141 (1974); FORBES, Apr. 1, 1974, at 54 ("As recently as 1962 there
were perhaps two lawsuits pending against CPA firms; today there are over 200. And if the
smaller accounting firms are included, the estimated number of pending legal suits is at least
500."). Counsel for one of the "big eight" has stated: "There have been at least a dozen major
settlements of over $1 million in the past several years." Id. But see Seidler, Don't Blame
The Auditors, CoNS. & FINANCIAL CHRONICLE, Dec. 7, 1972, at 1.
7. See AICPA, RESTATEMENT OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 26 (app. A) (1973)
[hereinafter cited as CPE RESTATEMENT]; id. at 35 (Interpretation 203-1); 1 AICPA, STATE-
MENT ON AUDrrING STANDARDS 80 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CPA-SAS].
8. For a concise statement of the current legal problems stemming from misunderstanding
of the audit and attest functions, see Gormley, supra note 6, at 1208-14. See also Mautz,
Accounting Principles-How Can They Be Made More Authoritative? 43 CPA J. 185 (1973);
Reiling & Burton, Financial Statements: Signposts as Well as Milestones, 50 HARv. Bus. Rav.
45 (1972); Address by SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Four Musts of Financial
Reporting, Meeting of AICPA, Jan. 8, 1974; Address by Robert R. Sterling, Distinguished
Lecture Series, Oklahoma State University, Mar. 16, 1972, in J. AccouNTANcY, Jan. 1973, at
61.
9. CPA-SAS 1-6.
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trol, and the evidentiary basis for the opinion, these rules contain a
section entitled "Standards of Reporting," which provides:
1. The report shall state whether the financial statements are
presented in accordance with generally accepted principles of
accounting.
2. The report shall state whether such principles have been
consistently observed in the current period in relation to the
preceding period.
3. Informative disclosures in the financial statements are to be
regarded as reasonably adequate unless otherwise stated in the
report.
4. The report shall either contain an expression of opinion re-
garding the financial statements, taken as a whole, or an asser-
tion to the effect that an opinion cannot be expressed. When an
overall opinion cannot be expressed, the reasons therefor should
be stated. In all cases where an auditor's name is associated with
financial statements, the report should contain a clear-cut indi-
cation of the character of the auditor's examination, if any, and
the degree of responsibility he is taking."0
It is clear that the auditor does not purport to make "factual repre-
sentations with respect to the financial statements or books of ac-
count [but] rather . . . an opinion on financial data consisting of
management representations."" In other words, the auditor does
10. CPE RESTATMENT 27 (app. A).
Ambiguities in the concept of presenting infomation fairly "in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles" recently have been explored in Rosenfield & Lorensen, The
Auditors' Responsibilities and the Audit Report, J. AccoUNrrANcy, Sept. 1974, at 73. SEC Reg.
S-X, Rule 2-02(c), 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02(c) (1974), applicable to all "certificates" on financial
statements filed with the SEC, provides: "The accountant's report shall state clearly: (1) The
opinion of the accountant in respect of the financial statements covered by the report and
the accounting principles and practices reflected therein; and (2) the opinion of the accoun-
tant as to the consistency of the. application of the accounting principles, or as to any changes
in such principles which have a material effect on the financial statements as required to be
set forth in Rule 3-07(a)." This rule formerly used the term "certificate" to refer to what the
profession now prefers to call a "report." See D. CARiCHmEL, THE AuDrroRs REPORTING Ou-
GATION - ToE MEEIINm AND IMPLEMENTATION oF THE FoURrn STANDARD OF REPORTING 11-31
(1972).
11. CPA-SAS 133. Auditors have noted the difficulties of communicating this thought to
the public. At the First Seaview Symposium on corporate financial reporting in 1968, Joseph
L. Roth, then Chariman of the AICPA Committee on Auditing Procedure, stated:
Do the users of auditor's reports understand very much about this role of the
independent auditor? There seems to be plenty of evidence that they do not. If
so, why not? Doesn't his report make clear what the auditor has done and what
responsibility he is assuming with respect to the financial statements? Some of
us are convinced that the present standard form of auditor's report not only does
not make either of these clear but, unfortunately, may even be a major contribu-
19741
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not guarantee numerical accuracy, but says only that in his opinion
on the basis of evaluations and tests performed by him in accord-
ance with professional practices, the numbers, taken as a whole,
give an undistorted picture of the company's financial position and
that the form complies with professional rules for such a presenta-
tion, including "all informative disclosures necessary to make the
statements not misleading."
'
'
2
As seen by an authoritative commentator, the general objectives
of the reporting standards are "equity," "communication," and
"environment."'' 3 "Equity" requires a balancing of the advantages
and disadvantages of various forms of reports to serve the competing
interests of different users." "Communication" represents the de-
sire to provide a report that is comprehensible to its readers,' 5 while
"environment" connotes the need for uniformity and compliance
with regularity requirements.' 6
tor to the general misunderstanding.
Roth, The Role of the Auditor, in CORPORATE FIACIAL REPORTING: CONFLICTS AND
CHALLENGES 248 (J. Burton ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as SEAVIEw I].
12. CPA-SAS 81. This is the official gloss on the so-called "Fourth Standard of Reporting."
Interpreting the third standard, which requires the presentation to be "reasonably adequate,"
it is said: "Verbosity should not be mistaken for adequate disclosure. What constitutes a
matter requiring disclosure is for the independent auditor to decide in the exercise of his
judgment in light of the circumstances and facts of which he is aware at that time. . . . If
matters which an independent auditor believes require disclosure are omitted from the finan-
cial statements, the matters should be included in his report and he should appropriately
qualify his opinion." Id. at 78.
13. D. CARMICHAEL, supra note 10, at 50-51.
14. "The problems faced by investors when evaluating financial statements for investment
purposes must be balanced, for example, against the interests of regulat6ry agencies inter-
ested in using the audit report as a means of social control, and the interests of management
in keeping potentially damaging information confidential." Id. at 50.
"ITihe fairness of the representations made through financial statements is an implicit
and integral part of management's responsibility. . . . [The independent auditor's] respon-
sibility for the statements he has examined is confined to the expression of his opinion on
them. The financial statements remain the representations of management." CPA-SAS 1-2.
15. The preparation of an audit report is essentially a communication process
in which the auditor's conclusions about the financial statements are transmit-
ted to the users of the statements. To convey an adequate understanding, the
auditor must reduce a complex of judgments to a concise statement, in abstract
form, using highly descriptive words. Since users cannot be expected to under-
stand a large number of technical nuances in report language, a high degree of
uniformity in the meaning of words used in the report is desirable.
D. CAAMICHAEL, supra note 10, at 50.
"The objective of the fourth reporting standard is to prevent misinterpretation of the degree
of responsibility the independent auditor is assuming whenever his name is associated with
financial statements." CPA-SAS 80. See also D. CARICHAEL, supra note 10, at 131; CPE
RESTATEMENT 10.
16. D. CARMICHAEL, supra note 10, at 50-51.
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These concerns, then, underlie the almost universal use of a
"short-form" report by auditors to fulfill the requirements of the
fourth standard of reporting. 7 This report form, which originated in
1934 in an effort to reduce uncertainty about the meaning of an
opinion, contains a form of words that must be used whenever the
auditor expresses an unqualified opinion." The Statement on Au-
diting Standards delineates four situations that prevent the use of
the standard short-form report: (1) when the scope of examination
has been limited or affected by various constraints, (2) when finan-
cial statements have not been presented in conformity with gener-
ally accepted accounting principles, including adequate disclosure,
(3) when accounting principles have not been applied consistently,
and (4) when unusual uncertainties exist concerning future develop-
ments, the effects of which reasonably cannot be estimated or other-
wise resolved satisfactorily.1 9
The SEC has indicated that a less than unqualified opinion will
be accepted in connection with public offerings only if within the
fourth category regarding future uncertainties." Furthermore, the
AICPA Restatement of the Code of Professional Ethics states: "If a
CPA disagrees with a client on a significant matter during the
course of an audit, the client has three choices - he can modify the
financial statements (which is usually the case), he can accept a
qualified report or he can discharge the CPA.212 Accordingly, audi-
17. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
18. CPA-SAS 80-81. For a discussion of the evolution of the "short-form" and other reports,
see D. CARmicnL, supra note 10, at 11-31. Early reports sometimes stated that certain
specified items had been "verified" and that the auditor "certified" that the financial state-
ments correctly set forth the client's financial condition. This was the'so-called "long" or
"descriptive" certificate, which was thought to be misleading. The AICPA Statement on
Auditing Standards sets forth the relatively limited categories of circumstances when an
opinion may be qualified, CPA-SAS 97, and states that an adverse opinion must be rendered
"where the exceptions are so material that in the independent auditor's judgment a qualified
opinion is not justified." Id. at 83. A disclaimer of opinion, which means that no opinion can
be expressed, must be made if the "examination has not produced sufficient competent
evidential matter to form an opinion on the financial statements taken as a whole ... ." Id.
19. CPA-SAS 97. Nothing prevents the addition of descriptive or explanatory material to
the opinion, as long as this clearly does not qualify the opinion. Id. at 112-13. A "long-form
opinion" can be issued, including "details of the items in these statements, statistical data,
explanatory comments, other informative material, some of which may be of a nonaccounting
nature, and sometimes a description of the scope of the auditor's examination more detailed
than the description in the usual short-form reports." Id. at 132.
20. Id. at 153.
21. CPE RPmTATEmENT 10. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 90 (Mar. 1, 1962) states in
part:
A "subject to" or "except for" opinion paragraph in which these phrases refer
1974
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tors sometimes are constrained by the current reporting framework
to a choice between taking an exception based on a judgmental
evaluation, which might invite SEC inquiry and foreclose the
client's effort to raise capital, with consequent risk of discharge, or
remaining silent, which creates an appearance of regularity and
invites potential liability.2 This dilemma necessitates an inquiry
into the expectations of the public, the courts, and the SEC regard-
ing this reporting process.
Responsibilities and Liabilities
Recent commentaries on the reporting process by leading writers
and regulators have emphasized a need for auditors to do more than
merely inspect accounts and evaluate the use of generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP). Dr. John C. Burton, Chief Accoun-
tant of the SEC, has pointed to the need for financial statements
that "make sense within the framework of the accounting model."2
Similarly, according to SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommer, the fin-
ancial statements must "represent an unbiased selection of relevant
data presented in an understandable way that makes sense to the
careful reader." 2' But are these standards more strict than, or differ-
to the scope of the audit, indicating that the accountant has not been able to
satisfy himself on some significant element in the financial statements, is not
acceptable in certificates filed with the Commission in connection with the
public offering of securities. The "subject to" qualification is appropriate when
the reference is to a middle paragraph or to footnotes explaining the status of
matters which cannot be resolved at statement date.
For a discussion of the origin and effect of this ruling, see D. CAIIMCHAEL, supra note 10,
at 28, 52, 85-86. A "subject to" opinion is now employed only with respect to the fourth
category of qualification, "uncertainties concerning future developments." An auditor may
request SEC acceptance of a qualified opinion in a report filed under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. See SEC Form 10-K, Instruction No. 9.
22. CPE RSTATEMENT 10.
23. Dr. Burton has stated:
I think that it is important, however the [Financial Accounting Standards
Board] articulates the standard, that the accountants not forget to sit back and
-see if the end product makes sense in the particular factual circumstances. We
have been concerned in some circumstances by a tendency to look at specific
transactions but not to consider the impact upon the whole, or to look at the
form of transactions rather than the substance. We think that in the final
analysis accountants have to have a responsibility for saying that the financial
statements, taken as a whole, make sense within the framework of the account-
ing model.
Burton, Elephants, Flexibility, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board, 29 Bus. LAw.
151, 153-54 (1974) (Special Issue).
24. Commissioner Sommer observed:
While fraud and error are two sources of misleading data, an even more distress-
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ent from, those set forth in the Restatement of the Code of Profes-
sional Ethics, or the AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards?
Must independent auditors say, as these statements indicate,
whether the client has chosen the best available generally accepted
accounting principles, and must they see that the financial state-
ments are intelligible to laymen?
Some examples will illustrate the possible distinction being
drawn. If, in a year of sharply rising prices, a client switches from
the LIFO (last-in, first-out) to the FIFO (first-in, first-out) method
of inventory accounting producing a large "inventory profit," must
an auditor qualify his opinion if, without the "inventory profit," the
client's reported earnings otherwise would appear fiat?2" Most
AICPA members probably would answer "no," so long as the foot-
ing phenomenon which occasionally appears is the use of generally accepted
accounting principles to produce a misleading result. Some managements, with
the concurrence of their auditors, are prepared to embellish their performance
by the use of accounting tricks which refldct accounting results dramatically
different from economic results. Ultimately the market place exacts a penalty
for such activities.
In most cases it can be said that such problems arise because of differences
in the deferred accounting model and the solution can be argued to be an
improvement in the model. While the Commission strongly endorses attempts
to improve the accounting model and has encouraged standard setting bodies
such as The Financial Accounting Standards Board to do so, quite frankly I do
not believe that this is a sufficient approach. In the final analysis, we need a
standard of fairness as the fourth "must" in financial reporting and public
accountants must be ready to insist that the standard is met.
. do not belittle the problem of definition, but it does not seem consistent
with the public responsibility of professionals to say that the blind application
of prescribed formulae is sufficient to meet the obligation imposed by society.
The auditor must be satisfied in his own mind that financial statements repre-
sent an unbiased selection of relevant data presented in an understandable way
that makes sense to the careful reader. If they do not meet that test, they are
not fair ....
Address by SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Four Musts of Financial Reporting,
Meeting of AICPA, Jan. 8, 1974.
The development of a "fairness" concept that is satisfactory to the SEC and the financial
community would seem to be one of the cornerstones of the SEC's recently announced policy
on "differential disclosure." See, e.g., Address by SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr., Improved
Disclosure-Opportunity and Responsibility for Financial Analysts, Financial Analysts Fed-
eration Annual Conference, Apr. 29, 1974; Address by SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr.,
Differential Disclosure: To Each His Own, Second Emanuel Saxe Distinguished Accounting
Lecture, Baruch College, Mar. 19, 1974.
25. See Wallich & Wallich, Profits Aren't as Good as They Look, FORTUNE, Mar. 1974, at
126; FOREs, Jan. 15, 1974, at 49. See also Taking the Measure of Last Year's Profits, Bus.
WEEK, Mar. 9, 1974, at 133; The Profits Dip That Wasn't, Bus. WnrK, Apr. 20, 1974, at 33.
The Accounting Principles Board has made such switches more difficult by requiring the
new method to be clearly preferable. See AICPA, OPINONS OF THE AccomUNG PxmcnqLs
BOARD No. 20, at 390-91 (1971).
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notes disclose adequately the magnitude of the inventory profit in
the current and prior periods in accordance with AICPA and SEC
rules.2" It is doubtful, however, that the SEC would agree in every
such case that an independent auditor should accommodate his
client's decision.
Similarly, when management's own internal marketing studies
indicate that a newly introduced product will recoup its capitalized
development costs over a five-year period, and the auditor believes
that the study's conclusions are not unreasonable, should the audi-
tor commission an independent marketing study to evaluate the
reasonableness of the client's choice? Such detective work is not
explicitly required by the Statement on Auditing Standards." Nev-
ertheless, the SEC might not approve a "clean" opinion without
such an independent inquiry where the development costs involved
were "material."
Judicial standards appear to differ, at least in part, from those
developed by the AICPA. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has ruled that where an auditor helped prepare and ren-
dered a "clean" opinion on financial statements that were mislead-
ing to investors in an area of unclear accounting principles, he could
not rely completely on a defense that the statements as a whole
fairly presented the client's financial position in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles.? But if the auditor has
not rendered a "clean" opinion, he may be able to use the qualifica-
tion or disclaimer as a defense if the report sets forth clearly the
26. See SEC Accounting Series Release No. 151 (Jan. 3, 1974); SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5427 (Oct. 4, 1973). See also Financial Accounting Standards Board, Reporting the
Effects of General Price-Level Changes in Financial Statements, Feb. 15, 1974 (discussion
memorandum).
27. The Statement on Auditing Standards reviews the "third standard of field work,"
which states that "sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained. . . to afford a
reasonable basis for an opinion regarding the financial statements under examination." CPA-
SAS 55. "An auditor typically works within economic limits; his opinion, to be economically
useful, must be formulated within a reasonable length of time and at reasonable cost. The
auditor must decide. . . whether the evidential matter available to him within the limits of
time and cost is sufficient to justify formulation and expression of an opinion." Id. at 57. The
effect of such review on the ability to give a "clean" opinion is explored in the case of three
companies with problems similar to the development cost question, in All Numbers Are Not
Equal, FoRBEs, July 1, 1973, at 33.
28. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006
(1970). See Comment, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and Fair Presentation, 43
U. CoLo. L. REv. 51 (1971). The Simon holding is not absolutely clear, beyond the ruling that
where a defendant must prove that he acted in good faith in a judgmental matter, proof of
form and content of presentation in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles
is persuasive but not conclusive.
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nature of the qualification or disclaimer on the basis of a proper
review of the client's affairs in accordance with the applicable
standard of care. 9 At present, however, that standard of care is
uncertain. Until recently, common law rules of auditor liability pro-
vided that, where a client sues an auditor, on the basis of their
contractual relationship, the auditor is liable for failure to exercise
the care of an ordinarily prudent man in the performance of the
audit function; where persons, including investors, not in privity sue
an auditor, however, his liability arises only for fraud or gross negli-
gence. This holding of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co. 31
has been questioned, and in some jurisdictions auditors have been
held liable to an actually foreseen group of persons not in privity of
29. See, e.g., Stephens Indus. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971) (qualified
opinion held to disclose adequately the nature of the problems). Contra, C.I.T. Fin. Corp. v.
Glover, 224 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1955). See also Rhode Island Hosp. TrustNatl Bank v. Swartz,
Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972) (disclaimer held inadequate to
prevent liability to foreseen parties); Herzfeld v. Leventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEo. L. REP. T 94,574 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 1974)
(qualification deemed inadequate); D. CARIIcHAEL, supra note 10, at 32-48.
30. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 174 N.E. 441, 444
(1931). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTS § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966):
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in a
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for
the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information,
if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicat-
ing the information.
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the liability stated in subsection (1) is
limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of the persons for whose benefit and guidance
he intends to supply the information, or knows that the recipient intends
to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction which he intends the infor-
mation to influence, or knows that the recipient so intends, or in a sub-
stantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information
extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty
is created in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
The Restatement thus imposes liability to a foreseen class of persons for negligence in the
audit function. The Reporter, Professor Prosser, stated that there were few cases, as of 1966,
that analyzed this liability; the limits on the size of the group were not clear. Clause (3)
clearly broadens an auditor's negligence liability, where he is "under a public duty," to cover
a foreseeable class of persons. Except in cases applying the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1970) (see notes 33-36 infra & accompanying text), it i% not clear that the law
has moved this far.
31. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); accord, Stephens Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & Sells,
438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971); Investment Corp. v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. Ct. App.
1968).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
contract for negligent auditing and financial reporting, even where
the report contained a disclaimer of opinion.32
The standard under the federal securities laws also is uncertain.
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.Y states that a false assertion
in financial statements within a prospectus and covered by an audi-
tor's report results in liability under section 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933, 31 even if the auditor had no fraudulent intent, unless he can
show thdt he made a "reasonable investigation."" At the very mini-
mum, an auditor must show that he followed generally accepted
auditing standards if his "due diligence" defense to section 11 liabil-
ity is to be successful. Accordingly, negligent reporting of financial
statements may be a basis for liability under the Securities Act of
1933; that proper observance of generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples is adequate evidence of due care under section 11 has not yet
been clearly established.
In actions under section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of
193411 and SEC rule 10b-511 the plaintiff must show some willful or
grossly negligent conduct on the part of the defendant. There has
been no express holding that auditors are liable to security holders
based on negligent certification of financial statements; there has
been language, however, implying that such liability exists, and
some courts evidently recognize that rule 10b-5 liability can be
based on negligence. 9 Moreover, rule 10b-5 liability has been im-
32. In Rhode Island Hasp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455
F.2d 847, 851-53 (4th Cir. 1972), the court held that public accountants could be liable in
negligence to a foreseen class of persons (creditors) relying on the financial statements. The
auditors had referred in their opinion to items they were unable to confirm, but failed to state
specifically that they had not verified the existence of certain leasehold improvements. This
case departed from the announced principle of Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85
(D.R.I. 1968), in which the court pointed out that "[n]o appellate court, English or American
has even held an accountant liable in negligence to reliant parties not in privity." Id. at 90.
See also Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1971);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 552, comment h (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966) (auditor's
disclaimer may provide protections).
33. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
35. 283 F. Supp. at 688.
36. Id. at 703. To sustain the defense, the auditor at least must seek documentation to
verify management's material representations. Id. See also United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d
796, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1969); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544,
575-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78(r) (1970).
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (Supp. 1973).
39. In Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. fI1. 1967), defendant's motion
to dismiss was denied; purchasers of securities registered under the Securities Exchange Act
[Vol. 16:71
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of 1934 could have a private right of action under section 10 and rule 10b-5 against the issuer's
auditors for an intentional or negligent misrepresentation because of the application of impro-
per auditing procedures or the utterance of untrue certifications of the issuer's financial
statements. Id. at 104. See also Annot. 46 A.L.R.3d 979 (1972). The Drake court questioned
and distinguished Heit v. Weitzen, 260 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), which had held that
sale of stock, without disclosing that certain corporate reports had overstated net assets and
income, is not actionable under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act because the
fraud was directed against the Government and not connected with any purchase or sale of
stock. Heit later was reversed, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit holding that open
market purchasers of the issuer's securities could base a rule lob-5 claim, sufficient to with-
stand a motion to dismiss, on allegations that defendant auditors knew or should have known
that statements in the issuer's annual reports and press releases, as well as documents filed
with the SEC, were materially false and misleading. Heft v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 913 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
But see Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (proof of scienter is an
essential element of a rule 10b-5 claim). The dissent in Lanza points out, however, that the
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have authority which questions the need for proof
of scienter. Id. at 1319.
Drake and Heit raise anew on the American legal scene the debate over retaining, where
"business fraud" is involved, the historic rule of Derry v. Peek, 14 A.C. 337 (1889), that an
allegation of simple negligence would not support an action for misrepresentation. The state-
ment complained of in Dery was in the prospectus of a tramway company. There was no
doubt that the statement was false and material, and that it had been relied upon by the
plaintiff. The House of Lords, however, ruled that there must be proof "that a false represen-
tation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth or (3) recklessly, careless
whether it be true or false." Id. at 374. For a discussion of this decision and its effect, see NV.
PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTS § 107 (4th ed. 1971). The basic scienter requirements of Derry have
been accepted in this country and find expression in the American Law Institute's
RESTATEhEN OF ToTs:
A misrepresentation in a business transaction is fraudulent if the maker
(a) knows or believes the matter to be otherwise than as represented,
or
(b) knows that he has not the confidence in its existence or non-
existence asserted by his statement of knowledge or belief, or
(c) knows that he has not the basis for his knowledge or belief professed
by his assertion.
RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 526 (1938). For an explication of the modem scienter concept, see
W. PROSSER, supra, § 107, at 700-02.
Prosser also notes that liability for damages resulting from erroneous statements or omis-
sions can be extended to include responsibility for negligent statements or even to invoke
strict liability. Id. at 704-14. When, as so constituted, it extends to unknown persons not in
privity, it amounts to warranty, on the theory of Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] L.R. 3 H.L.
330, and MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Courts in this
country have not extended warranty liability to business misrepresentation (see, e.g., Lanza
v. Drexel & Co., supra) but judicial consumerism conceivably could induce a court to make
issuers and their auditors insurers of adequate disclosure. Judge Cardozo emphasized early
that auditors' legal responsibility must be limited to avoid the impracticalities of imposing
broad liability to unknown persons. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170,
180, 174 N.E. 441, 444-45 (1931). It is no less important today, however, that some body of
statutory law clearly establish a basis for liability, including reasonable liability limits. See
notes 87-109 infra & accompanying text.
The English cases can be analyzed similarly. The leading case is Candler v. Crane, Christ-
mas & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164, holding an auditor not liable to a foreseeable third party in
1[974]
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posed in a stockholder's derivative action in which it was alleged
that the corporation was deceived through auditor collusion with
management."0 In other words, auditors now must be concerned not
only with responsibilities flowing directly from acts or omissions in
the course of the audit, but also with claims that they were "aiding
and abetting" management through association with a course of
dealing that was misleading to investors.4'
the absence of fraud. While some dicta imply that English courts might hold an auditor liable
in simple negligence to a foreseeable class of unknown persons (see, e.g., Hedley Byrne & Co.
v. Heller & Partners [1964] A.C. 465), the law has not moved this far, despite the inclination
of English accountants to assume that it has. See, e.g., Accountants' Liability to Third
Parties-The Hedley Byrne Decision, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Oct. 1965, at 66.
In White v. Abrams, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. Rap. 94,457 (9th
Cir. Mar. 15, 1974), the court rejected either a "negligence" or a "common law fraud" stan-
dard of liability for rule 10b-5 cases in favor of what the court called "the flexible duty
standard," essentially based upon an analysis of the defendant's relationship to the plaintiff
in the light of the plaintiff's access to information. This is an analysis not unlike that of SEC
v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953) (applicability of private offering exemption
under Securities Act of 1933 depends upon whether the class of persons affected needs the
Act's protection). The duty of care sounds in negligence where an ignorant plaintiff relies
entirely on a highly trusted defendant, and more in fraud where a well-informed plaintiff gets
casual information from the defendant, a business acquaintance. See White v. Abrams, supra
at 95,610. While it seems difficult to apply in a uniform manner, perhaps this formulation
may articulate what the courts actually do in this area.
40. Seeburg-Commonwealth United Litigation, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 93,217 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See also 18 WAYNE L. Rav. 1675 (1972). The court found
that a claim under rule 10b-5 was stated against the auditors for aiding and abetting manage-
ment's waste of corporate assets by approving, in advance of the transactions in question,
the allegedly improper manner in which management proposed to account for the transac-
tions in financial statements to be published after the transactions had been completed.
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. RaP. T 93,277, at 91,598. The case has been
settled by the accounting firm involved. See Wall Street Journal, Sept. 4, 1973, at 24, col. 1.
41. Thus, it was held recently that an auditor could be liable for common law deceit or
violation of section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because he failed to correct
previously certified financial statements after they were discovered to be false and misleading
to investors. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). This ruling resulted in
a new AICPA rule on subsequent events. AICPA CoMMIrra ON AuDrro PaocaDURE, STATE-
IMENT ON AuDrMNG PocaDuan [SAP] No. 41 (1969). SAP 41 has been consolidated into the
statement on auditing standards, CPA-SAS 127-31. The Committee on Auditing Procedure
has stated that if a CPA finds that unaudited financial statements "with which he may
become associated" are not in conformity with GAAP, he must insist on a revision and, if
necessary, withdraw. He is "associated" when he prepares or helps prepare the financial
reports or they appear in a document that, with his consent, uses his name. AICPA CoMMrr-
TEE ON AuDrnNG PROCDURE, STATEMENT ON AuDrriNG PROCEDURE No. 38 (1967). In May 1973,
the AICPA issued APB 28, governing interim financial statements. AICPA, OPnqONS OF THE
AccoulrN o PmeciEs BOARD No. 28 (1973). While there has been no specific Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) pronouncement on unaudited or interim financial re-
ports, there is undoubtedly a heightened concern. Marshall Armstrong of the FASB said
recently, ". . . I doubt that there are many CPA's in this country who have not reassessed
and probably altered the nature of their association with unaudited financial statements as
a result of the decisions in two or three relatively minor legal actions." Armstrong, supra note
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Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath 2 indicates
the current judicial view of an auditor's disclosure responsibilities.
The defendant in Herzfeld was held liable to a foreseen private
placement securities purchaser in a rule 10b-5 action involving the
defendant's special audit of the issuer. Because of the audit, the
defendant had expressed concern about profits shown by the issuer
on the sale of certain nursing home properties. Although ultimately
agreeing to include these profits in the income statement on a de-
ferred basis, the defendant qualified its report by a notation that the
report was "subject to the collectibility of the balance receivable on
the contract of sale (see Note 4 of Notes to Financial Statements).""
There was evidently no testimony that this type of qualification was
not in compliance with generally accepted accounting principles.
The court found, nevertheless, that note 4 was misleading because
it did not give details of the possible noncollectibility and contained
some statements that were clearly misleading, despite defendant's
actual knowledge of the facts. Furthermore, it was determined that
including the sale profits in the income statement itself was mis-
leading, given the omissions in the footnote. The plaintiff testified
that he had read the income statement and the report but had not
read footnote 4. The court concluded that the plaintiff nevertheless
had relied on the misleading income statement that the defendant
had helped to prepare for the plaintiff's benefit. It determined that
the defendant knew that the qualification alone, "absent disclosure
of the reasoning and facts which prompted it, would not alert poten-
tial investors to the uncertainties" of which the defendant had
knowledge.44
This court's message to auditors is clear and not new: to rely on
2, at 145-46. See, e.g., 1136 Tenants' Corp. v. Max Rothenberg & Co., 36 App. Div. 2d 804,
319 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1971), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 585, 281 N.E.2d 846, 330 N.Y.S.2d 800
(1972) (where accountant is not engaged to audit, he nevertheless must investigate beyond
scope of engagement where he finds suspicious circumstances). See generally Comment,
Auditors' Third Party Liability: An Ill-Considered Extension of the Law, 46 Wash. L. Rev.
675 (1971). But see Gold v. DCL Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,036
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (where firm was discharged before issuing report, it owed no duty to investor
to disclose its intention to qualify report or to force client to reflect its qualification in
preliminary unaudited figures released by client). See also Note, Accountants' Liabilities for
False and Misleading Financial Statements, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1437 (1967). APB 28 requires,
among other things, that interim financial statements be presented according to generally
accepted accounting principles. AICPA, OPINIONS OF TH ACcOUNTiNG PmNCimLES BOARD No.
28, 3 (1973).
42. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,574 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 1974).
43. Id. at 95,998.
44. Id. at 96,002-03.
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a qualification as a defense, it must be explicit. The notion that the
qualification must contain or refer to a detailed statement of the
facts giving rise to the qualification and the reasoning that led to
it is novel, however. The emphasis given to the qualification is as
important as the fact that it has been made. It is insufficient, evi-
dently, merely to follow the standard format of .the auditor's report
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Court
rulings that auditors may have duties to investors that arise from
the auditor's association with the client and cover more than the
proper audit of year-end financial statements give rise to trouble-
some implications regarding the courts' and the public's views of the
audit function.
These difficulties are not laid to rest by the position of the SEC.
In 1957, the SEC articulated its long-held point of view: "The re-
sponsibility of a public accountant is not only to the client who pays
his fee, but also to investors, creditors and others who may rely on
the financial statements he certifies."45 Moreover, this degree of
responsibility is more than that required by the profession or the
courts, who, until recently, have been concerned with whether the
terms of the engagement, as defined by the profession, have been
met. 6 The SEC continually has sought more, even to the point of
holding the auditor responsible for making both audited and un-
45. Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670 (1957). See also SEC Accounting
Series Release No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1974) (SEC reiteration of its position in disciplining a "big
eight" accounting firm for failing to make adequate inquiry of its predecessor firm's reasons
for disagreement with the client, an inquiry that would have yielded information tending to
raise a suspicion of fraud); Bus. WEEK, Mar. 2, 1974, at 76-77. The SEC position was articu-
lated formally in SEC Accounting Series Release No. 19 (Dec. 5, 1940):
In approaching his work with respect to companies which file with us or in which
there is a large public interest, the auditor must realize that, regardless of what
his position and obligations might have been when reporting to managers or to
owner-managers, he must now recognize fully his responsibility to public inves-
tors by including the activities of the management itself within the scope of his
work and reporting thereon to investors.
But see D. CA RmiCHAEL, supra note 10, at 129:
Auditors are qualified to examine financial facts objectively and to express
opinions on them, but they are not professionally qualified judges of human
character. Consequently, the reporting criterion of management intent does not
imply that audit programs contain a procedure that states "review and evaluate
management's motivation in choosing accounting methods." This is far from the
case. Rather, the criterion operates contingently in much the same fashion as
the going-concern assumption.
46. See CPE RESTATE MENT 8-16. See also Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332
F. Supp. 544, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (primary function of the detail in financial statements is
to enlighten the expert rather than the average reader).
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audited financial statements comprehensible by average investors.7
This concern was expressed in SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp.4" in which the SEC asserted that an auditor has an affirmative
duty to investors to ensure that unaudited interim financial state-
ments, which follow the audited statements in a merger proxy state-
ment, are not misleading. This duty includes informing the SEC of
the reasons for its withdrawal from the engagement if the client fails
to modify the statements in order to render them not misleading.
The foregoing discussion suggests disparate opinions among audi-
tors, the public, the SEC, and the courts regarding the nature of the
audit function. Liabilities are being imposed on the profession
partly because of its inability to develop a clear definition of its
relationship to the investor in a manner satisfactory to the courts.
A few writers have analyzed this problem, mostly in terms of
"9power," trying to develop a solution. Professor Mautz, for example,
after analyzing the failures of the Accounting Principles Board to
make substantial progress in promoting uniform generally accepted
accounting principles, warned: "In the past, accounting has been
unable to establish effective authority for its principles. Can it do
so in the future? Unless accounting can find some solid base for
47. See Burton, supra note 23; Address by Ray Garrett, Jr., Improved Disclosure-
Opportunity and Responsibility for Financial -Analysts, Financial Analysts Federation
Annual Conference, Apr. 29, 1974; Address by William J. Casey, The Partnership Between
The Accounting Profession and the SEC, Meeting of AICPA, Oct. 2, 1972 ("In my view, an
auditor must carry a responsibility for knowing what is going on at his client, what the
fundamental business situation is and whether the public reports being prepared adequately
reflect these things. In this connection, I would expect him to review interim reports before
they are issued to the public and to consult with his client on reporting problems as they
arise."). SEC Commissioner Sommer has observed:
Both former Chairman William J. Casey and present Chairman Ray Garrett
have properly suggested that auditors should be more involved in the interim
rejorting problems of their clients . . . . "Auditor of record" is an emerging
concept in the accounting profession and I would hope that it will be increas-
ingly filled with content. As I understand it, it is intended to identify the inde-
pendent accountant of the issuer and is intended to connote a continuing rela-
tionship - something akin to the concepts of "general counsel" in the legal
profession and "attorney of record" in the litigation scene.
Address by A.A. Sommer, The Four Musts of Financial Reporting, Meeting of AICPA, Jan.
8, 1974.
The SEC has stressed for many years the auditor's obligation to look beyond formal compli-
ance with "principles, practices and conventions" accepted at the time: "We believe that, in
addition to the question whether the individual items of financial statements are stated in
accordance with accounting principles, practices and conventions, there must be considered
the further question whether, on an overall basis, the statements are informative." Associated
Gas & Elec. Co., 11 S.E.C. 975, 1059 (1942).
48. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 193,360 (D.D.C. 1972). Individual
audit personnel were indicted in the case. See Wall Street Journal, Jan. 18, 1974, at 4, col. 2.
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political authority, prospects for progress in financial reporting are
not bright."4 In a speech entitled "Accounting Power," Professor
Sterling also noted the absence of a power base for the profession,"
while former SEC Chairman Casey has analyzed the problem as a
direct relationship between reduced liability and increased respon-
sibility.5' These efforts, however, although expressing concern about
the auditor's position, do not suggest precisely how increased re-
sponsibility will lead to reduced liability exposure, nor is it clear
what balance of liability and responsibility would be acceptable to
the profession. Some answers will now be suggested, based upon the
profession's own emerging analysis that emphasizes that not all
precisely quantified information presented in financial statements
can be verified; rather, it is "interpretive," based on judgment and
prediction.52
49. Mautz, supra note 8, at 190. See also Gormley, supra note 6, at 1205.
50. Professor Sterling stated:
The major problem facing public accounting today is its lack of power. First, in
comparing the power or authority to the responsibility, we find that the respon-
sibility far outweighs the authority. The public accountant must act judicially
but he has not been given the power to enforce his rulings. His ultimate weapon
is resignation and silence, which puts him in a conflict-of-interest position
. . . . The authority is lessened further by the existence of competition among
accounting firms. Resignation from an engagement might be an effective means
of enforcement if it were not for the fact that other firms may take the engage-
ment and issue an opinion.
Second, in comparing the power of the public accountant to that of manage-
ment, we find that management's power far outweighs the accountant's. This
imbalance is not undesirable per se. When one considers the fact that accoun-
tants must judge managements, however, it is not only undesirable, it is intoler-
able. . . . It would be equally damaging to the legal system if litigants were
able to select from diverse or flexible laws as they saw fit. The same is true in
regard to accounting: if accountants are to judge managements, then we must
deny managements the power to hire and fire accountants and the power to
select from diverse accounting principles as they see fit.
Sterling, supra note 8, at 66.
51. Chairman Casey has stated:
My own view, and a strong one, is that one gets better protection from liability
from moving forward to broaden the area of responsibility rather than trying to
narrow or restrict it ....
The message seems to me to be clear. The accountant must be willing to meet
the enlarged expectations of a critical public. I do believe he should seek and
take responsibility for appraisals of internal control, the content of annual re-
ports and even future oriented data. If he does this with professionalism and
with good faith I believe the threat of liability will become less rather than more
capricious and dangerous.
Address by William J. Casey, The Partnership Between the Accounting Profession and the
SEC, Meeting of AICPA, Oct. 2, 1972. See also Norby, The Needs and Responsibilities of
the Investor in Equities, in SFAvmw I, supra note 11, at 97, 108.
52. See TRUEBLOOD REPORT 33-34.
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Categories of Information in Financial Statements
In a rare foray into accounting, the Supreme Court stated:
To make a fetish of mere accounting is to shield from examina-
tion the deeper causes, forces, movements and conditions which
should govern rates. Even as a recording of current transactions,
bookkeeping is hardly an exact science. As a representation of
the condition and trend of a business, it uses symbols of cer-
tainty to express values that actually are in constant flux. It
may be said that in commercial or investment banking or any
business extending credit success depends on knowing what not
to believe in accounting. Few concerns go into bankruptcy or
reorganization whose books do not show them solvent and often
even profitable. If one cannot rely on accountancy accurately to
disclose past or current conditions of a business, the fallacy of
using it as a sole guide to future price policy ought to be appar-
ent. However, our quest for certitude is so ardent that we pay
an irrational reverence to a technique which uses symbols of
certainty, even though experience again and again warns us that
they are delusive.
This judicial commentary finds a curious echo in recent statements
by accountants about the content of financial statements.54 Thus it
appears that an emphasis on precision and certainty in the body of
the financial statements themselves, coupled with the delphic pron-
ouncement of the auditor that the statements "fairly present" the
company's financial position, may create public expectations, and,
ultimately, auditor liabilities, that may be unduly large in view of
the uncertainties involved.
How, qualitatively, can information in financial statements be
categorized from the standpoint of the auditor's task? The True-
blood Report emphasized a distinction between "factual" and "in-
terpretive" information:
Economic decison-makers need both factual and interpretive
information-identified separately to the extent possible-
53. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 643 nA0 (1944).
54. Users often misunderstand the judgments that are required to quantify
many financial statement items as well as their level of accuracy. Because the
presentation of financial statements implies a high degree of precision, users do
not realize that what seems precise often, in fact, is not. In a conventional
statement of financial position, cash may be the only asset that can be stated
with a relatively high degree of precision and reliability. The amounts shown
for all other assets, as well as some liabilities are less precise.
TRUEBLOOD REPORT 45. See also Burton, supra note 23; Reiling & Burton, supra note 8.
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about transactions and other events in order to assess uncer-
tainty. Factual information can be measured objectively. In-
terpretive information is largely subjective and frequently can-
not be easily quantified. Unfortunately, much information is
neither purely factual nor purely interpretive, so that, as a
practical matter, the distinctions between factual and interpre-
tive information are not as precise as users would like them to
be.
As an objective of financial statements,5 the Trueblood Commit-
tee emphasized the need to serve primarily users "who have limited
authority, ability, or resources to obtain information. . . ."I' This
objective is not unlike that propounded by the SEC's Dr. Burton,
suggesting that financial statements "taken as a whole, make sense
within the framework of the accounting model,"-" or the rule 10b-5
holding in at least one case that presentation according to generally
accepted accounting principles, without more, is no defense to a
claim that financial statements are misleading." The auditor must
do more than assure the presentation's fairness and completeness;
he must, in a sense, place himself in the position of a reasonably
prudent investor having no acquaintance with the company and ask
55. TRUEBLOOD REPORT 33. Elsewhere, the report made specific suggestions: "Financial
statements are more useful if they include but distinguish information that is primarily
factual, and therefore can be measured objectively, from information that is primarily in-
terpretive." Id. at 14. "In all reporting, the assumptions, interpretations, predictions, and
estimations that underlie the preparer's conclusions should be set forth. The nature and
extent of detail given in support of these conclusions is a matter of application. The test is
whether the information presented enables users to make their own assessments of uncertain
matters and of the conclusions of the preparer." Id. at 34. "To satisfy the individual prefer-
ences of users for predicting and controlling the impact of current events on enterprise earning
power, some apparently simple quantifications should be supplemented to represent their
actual complexities by disclosing ranges of precision, reliability and uncertainty." Id. at 40.
"To accomplish this basic objective, it may be that financial statements should not be limited
solely to quantified information. Amplification, in narrative form, of data included in state-
ments' may be required." Id. at 13. See also McGarraugh, The Viewpoint of the Credit
Grantor, in SEAvMw I, supra note 11, at 113, 118.
The SEC has announced the adoption of Guide No. 22 of Guides to Preparation and Filing
of Registration Statements, effective September 30, 1974, requiring a registration statement
to include a management discussion and analysis of the summary of earnings. SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5520 (Aug. 12, 1974). The effect of this added disclosure on the scope of
auditors' responsibilities and liabilities is not yet entirely clear.
56. See note 3 supra & accompanying text.
57. TRUEBLOOD REPORT 17.
58. Burton, supra note 23, at 153-54. See also Address by SEC Commissioner A.A. Som-
mer, Jr., Differential Disclosure: To Each his Own, Second Emanuel Saxe Distinguished
Accounting Lecture, Baruch College, Mar. 19, 1974.
59. Seeburg-Commonwealth United Litigation, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fan.
SEc. L. REP. 1 93,277 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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whether this person, if he read the financial statements carefully,
nevertheless would remain unaware of their essential import. The
auditor is responsible not merely for the reasonableness of what the
statements say but also for what they mean to the average investor;
he must communicate or translate the statements where, on their
face, they are unintelligible to that class of users.
The Trueblood Report's analysis implies that financial state-
ments tend to be unintelligible to the average investor when infor-
mation of an "interpretive," rather than a "factual," nature is pre-
sented. In these situations, such as valuation of assets, size of re-
serves, or capitalization of deferred costs, the auditor must be par-
ticularly concerned that his liability may exceed the scope of his
engagement. It is submitted that liability will be reduced to the
extent the auditor moves away from implying that he has conferred
certainty upon financial statements and to the extent that, through
professional or statutory rule, he takes affirmative steps to "trans-
late" financial statements to reveal their judgmental nature where
necessary for the understanding of average investors. Several proce-
dures are available to auditors to reduce their exposure to liability,
with varying degrees of effectiveness. An examination of them will
demonstrate, however, that there is a need to seek a more promising
alternative.
PRESENT ATrEmpTs To SPECIFY RESPONSBILITY
Auditor Disagreements: The Form 8-K Procedure
SEC requirements for reporting auditor changes, first adopted in
1971, were revised in December 1974 to increase their effectiveness.
When a reporting company learns of the impending withdrawal of
the principal accountant for its own most recently filed financial
statements, or those of a significant subsidiary, and when it engages
a new accountant, it must report such changes to the SEC on Form
8-K within 10 days after the month the announcement is made."5
The company also must state in the form whether, in the two years
preceding the announcement, there were any disagreements con-
cerning accounting matters or whether the prior auditor's report
60. SEC Form 8-K. See 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. % 31,002-03 (1974). The amended Form
8-K procedure is effective for reports filed after January 31, 1975. See SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5550 (Dec. 20, 1974). This release also announced modification of SEC proxy
rules to require certain disclosure to investors regarding appointment and withdrawal of
auditors. For consideration of a proceeding against an auditor, see SEC Accounting Series
Release No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1973).
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contained an adverse opinion or a disclaimer of opinion or was quali-
fied because of uncertainty, audit scope, or accounting principles.
The nature of each such adverse opinion, disclaimer, or qualifica-
tion must be described. In addition, the company must obtain from
the prior auditor a letter commenting on the statements contained
in the company's report;"' this letter must be sent to the SEC where
it will be on public file.
Because the Form 8-K device is new, and because it has unre-
solved interpretive uncertainties, its success as a means to allow
auditors to meet their disclosure objectives cannot be predicted.
One effect, however, should be noted: a recent study of the 250
instances of auditor changes reported on a Form 8-K between Nov-
ember 1971 and February 1973 indicates only 14 cases (5.6 percent)
of disagreement concerning accounting matters. One-hundred forty-
one of these 250 companies responded to a supplemental research-
ers' questionnaire. Of these, 47 percent indicated that the auditor's
fee was too high and 44 percent indicated that dissatisfaction with
services provided was a reason for the change; eleven percent indi-
cated disagreement on accounting matters as a reason. 2 These fig-
ures are consistent with an informal count by the SEC of 450 auditor
changes made in 1973, which showed that 10 percent changed be-
cause of disagreement. 3 The Form 8-K device thus apparently has
not revealed the existence of all accounting disputes that have a
bearing on auditor changes. Recent changes in the procedure to
expand the scope of matters reported on and to require that the
registrant describe relations with its auditors in its annual meeting
proxy material may improve this record.65
It is difficult at this time to evaluate the effectiveness of the new
61. SEC Form 8-K, Item 12. See 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. % 31,002, at 21,996 (1974).
62. Bedingfield & Loeb, Auditor Changes - An Examination, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Mar. 1974,
at 66-68.
63. Hawes, Stockholder Appointment of Independent Auditors: A Proposal, 74 COLUm!. L.
Ev. 1, 18 (1974).
64. Id. at 17. On February 25, 1974, the SEC announced a consent order disciplining a
major accounting firm for, among other things, failing to make adequate inquiry of the
predecessor auditor in a Form 8-K switch involving U.S. Financial Inc. See SEC Accounting
Series Release No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1974). See also When Companies and Auditors Fight and
Switch, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 2, 1974, at 76-77.
65. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5550 (Dec. 20, 1974). See also Bedingfield & Loeb,
supra note 62; Hobgood & Sciarrino, Management Looks at Audit Services, FiNANciAL
EXEcunvE, Apr. 1972, at 26. The SEC permits preliminary audits of broker-dealers prior to
the balance sheet date, at the option of the auditors, SEC Rule 17a-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5
(1974), but the auditor must notify the SEC of any material inadequacies in the accounting
or internal control systems. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10297 (July 25, 1973).
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8-K procedure in reducing auditor liability exposure. Undeniably,
the procedure increases the stakes for both auditor and client in the
event of a disagreement and tends to promote an adversary relation-
ship with respect to the presentation of interpretive information in
financial statements."5 These effects by themselves would seem to
exacerbate the difficulties of auditors where their engagement is
thought to lead to a representation that a single set of numbers does
or does not express a fair statement of financial position. No doubt
the 8-K device is useful; it probably does not reduce an auditor's
liability exposure on the financial statements he reports, however.
The Audit Committee
As part of a 1940 administrative order, the SEC urged that an
audit committee of the board of directors be established, composed
of "outside" directors, to review the company's financial statements
with the independent auditor. 7 Since then, the audit committee has
been accepted by a significant number of large corporations as a
useful device to improve communication between auditors and the
board.68
66. See SEC Accounting Series Release No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1974). To an extent, an adversary
position must be recognized as a reality in the management-auditor relationship. For an
unusually frank analysis of the various management incentives to depart from strict adher-
ance to the basic goals of financial reporting, see Hayes, Ethical Standards in Financial
Reporting: A Critical Review, in CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING: ETHICAL AND OTHER
PRoBL ms, 79-80. (J. Burton ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as SEAVmW I]. Yet the literature
indicates that the professional goal of auditors is to resolve the conflicts responsibly within
the context of a confidential relationship, rather than by public discussion of differences.
CPA-SAS 78-79, 128; CPE RESTATEMENT 12, 23 (Rule 301), 36 (Interpretation 301-1). But see
Olson, Ethical Problems of the Auditor in Financial Reporting, in SEAvw 11153-54 ("Under
no circumstances should the auditor allow confidentiality to take precedence over his respon-
sibility to see that the client's financial statements are fair and not misleading."). State
statutes relating to confidentiality of auditor communications tend to make the decision to
disclose more difficult. Sixteen states now provide by statute that accountant-client commu-
nications in certain contexts are privileged. The efficacy of these provisions in litigation under
the revised Federal Rules of Evidence has been questioned. See Jentz, Accountant Privi-
leged Communications: Is it a Dying Concept Under the New Federal Rules of Evidence? 11
Am. Bus. L.J. 149 (1973). See also Note, Couch v. United States: The Supreme Court Takes
a Look at the Accountant-Client _Privilege-or Does It? 62 Ky. L.J. 263 (1973).
67. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 19 (Dec. 5, 1940). The SEC now requires disclosure
in annual meeting proxy materials regarding the existence of an audit committee. See SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5550 (Dec. 20, 1974).
68. See R. MAui-z & F. NEMuANN, CORPORATE Aunrr Comhi-rm s (1970). A series of ques-
tionnaires yielded responses from 385 corporations, 121 (32 percent) of which indicated that
they had audit committees. Thirty-six of the 52 responding corporations with more than $500
million in sales had audit committees. The authors state: "Our interviews reinforced the
hypothesis that audit committees are not commonly found. This is further supported by the
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With its emphasis on communication, the audit committee device
seemingly would foster financial statements that are properly un-
derstandable by the average investor. In practice, this result is not
entirely clear, although audit committees undoubtedly improve
communications between auditors and directors. The committee's
duties generally do not seem to be defined in a manner that encour-
ages a review of the presentation; 9 the typical appointing resolution
apparently emphasizes the audit function. Further, it is not clear
that the members of the committee generally tend to view their task
as one of refining the presentation. Indeed, a study by Professors
Mautz and Neumann indicates that most of the non-officer direc-
tors questioned about the audit function indicated that it was the
province of management or the outside auditors." Members of the
audit committees did not seem to be particularly expert in account-
ing and auditing2' This reluctance to become involved in a review
findings of the NICB study made in 1966." Id. at 16, citing J. BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP
PRACTICES, STUDIES IN BUSINESS POLICY, No. 125, at 135 (1967). The report listed the most
frequently cited functions of such committees, in order of importance: reviewing and trans-
mitting to the board of directors the auditor's report, reviewing the auditor's evaluation of
internal controls, defining the purpose and scope of the audit, appointment and nomination
of independent auditors, and a variety of less significant functions. R. MAtzrr & F. NEUMANN,
supra, at 23. For further data on the audit committee, see Price Waterhouse & Co., The Audit
Committee, The Board of Directors and The Independent Accountant (1973). This pamphlet
proposes the following responsibilities of an audit committee: to "provide assistance to the
board in fulfilling its audit responsibilities" and to "maintain, by way of regularly scheduled
meetings, a direct line of communications between the directors and independent accoun-
tants to provide for exchanges of views and information." Id. at 8. This is in accord with the
AICPA Executive Committee Statement on Audit Committees of the Board of Directors. See
J. ACCOUNTANCY, Sept. 1967, at 10. See also SEC Accounting Series Release No. 126 (July 5,
1972); NEw YoRK STOCK EXCHANGE, RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS ON FINANCIAL REPORT-
ING TO SHAREHOLDERS AND RELATED MATTERS 6 (1973); Arthur Anderson & Co., The Audit
Committee of the Board of Directors (November 1972); Touche, Ross & Co., Corporate Audit
Committees (December 1970); Farrell, The Audit Committee-A Lawyer's View, 28 Bus.
LAw. 1089 (1973) (supporting the usefulness of such a committee of outside directors).
69. For example, the AICPA Executive Committee Statement, Audit Committees of the
Board of Directors, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Sept. 1967, at 10, indicates essentially that the audit
committee is to "discuss," "review," "invite views," and "communicate" regarding the audi-
tor's functions. See also R. MAuTZ & F. NEUMANN, supra note 68, at 41-42: "[P]erhaps no
other characteristic of corporate audit committees varies so much from company to company
as to the duties assigned to the committee. . . .In some cases the function of the committee
is not stated at all, the only record being a notation in the minutes designating the member-
ship of the Committee . . ."
70. R. MAuTrz & F. NEUMANN, supra note 68, at 47-48.
71. The Mautz and Neumann study states:
Over and over, from all types of persons interviewed, we heard the statement
that if a person will make a good board member he will make a good member
of the corporate audit committee. The consensus regarding requirements for
satisfactory membership on the corporate audit committee in order of import-
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of the audit function may be based to some extent on the realization
that, in suits based on the financial reports, defenses are available
to a director under federal securities and state corporate laws, if he
relied on the opinion of an expert. 2
It may well be that the audit .committee's functions could be
altered by rule or statute to require it to review the presentation, to
require that it be composed of persons competent in auditing, and
to refine its "expert reliance" defenses.13 Auditors possibly could be
ance seems to be: first, high-level executive experience and responsibility; sec-
ond, some financial background; and third, some experience in working with
CPA's. The last of these was considered to be much less significant than the first
tWo."
R. MAuTz & F. NEumANN, supra note 68, at 39-40.
A recent study of 553 corporate directors of 46 "Fortune 500" companies indicates that 55
percent of these directors were "insiders" and 32 percent of the '.'outside" directors were
executives of other companies. Seventy-five percent of the directors spent less than 10 hours
per month on board activities. See FNANciAL ExEcuTW, Jan. 1974, at 7. On the question of
effectiveness of the board as a protector of shareholder and public interests, see Clendenin,
Company Presidents Look at the Board of Directors, CALIF. MANAGEMENT Rsv., Spring 1972,
at 60. See also Blumberg, Reflections on Proposals for Corporate Reform Through Change in
the Composition of the Board of Directors: "Special Interest" or "Public" Directors, 53
B.U.L. Ray. 547 (1973).
There is a well-respected viewpoint that the board cannot function at all as it is supposed
to function without full-time independent directors who are professional, highly compen-
sated, properly supplied with their own staff, and given specific powers of inquiry. See
Schwartz, A Plan to Save the Board, 28 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 279 (1973). Observations of
this nature tend to question the utility of audit committees without the existence of more
fundamental reform in the legal structure of the board. The outlook for such reform is not
particularly promising, however. For example, one article reported: "The Investor Responsi-
bility Research Center, a Washington-based public interest group, surveyed a group of chief
executives recently and found that few wanted the board selection process opened to greater
shareholder participation. Similarly, there was little interest in opening the board to consti-
tuency representatives." Burgen, CommentarylChief Executive, Bus. WEEK, May 4, 1974, at
86.
72. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 provides a "due diligence" defense to directors
who rely on "expert" portions of a registration statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). Certain
state corporate statutes provide similar defenses. For example, section 65 of the Massachu-
setts Business Corporation Law, MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 156B, § 65 (1970), reads in part as
follows: "In discharging his duties, any [director or officer], when acting in good faith, shall
be entitled to rely upon the books of account of the corporation or upon written reports made
to the corporation by any of its officers, other than such person, or by an independent public
accountant." See also Scott, Enforcement of Ethical Standards in Corporate Financial
Reporting, in SEAvmw I1, supra note 66, at 107.
73. Certain Canadian corporate statues now require that the audit committee of a publicly
held corporation actually review and approve the financial statements before they are submit-
ted to the board for approval. See, e.g., ONT. Bus. CORP. ACT § 182(3) (1970). See also SELECT
CoMM. ON CoMPANY LAw, INrEIM REPORT 91-92, 15 & 16 Eliz. 2, 27th Leg., 5th Sess. (1967).
A similar provision is proposed for the Canadian Companies Act. See 1 R. DICKERSON, J.
HOWARD & L. GETZ, PROPOSALS FOR A NEw BusiNEss CORPORATIONS LAW FOR CANADA 112 (1971);
2 id. at 107-08.
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encouraged to address specific questions of emphasis to the commit-
tee. Even if altered, however, the audit committee device does not
help the auditors directly to limit their exposure. Ultimately, the
auditors themselves should decide whether financial statements
carry the right import; an audit committee can be useful only to
guarantee that management does not always have the final word on
company disagreement with that decision.
Statutory Provisions Relative to Auditors
To the extent that auditor responsibilities are related to a statu-
tory measure of liability, concomitant statutory improvement of the
mechanics of auditor selection and delineation of duties can help
auditors clarify their responsibilities while limiting their exposure.
American corporate statutes generally do not include audit require-
ments, however. Special corporate statutes relating to banks and
certain types of insurance companies do provide for independent
audit, but these laws are not directly analogous because the auditors
often are state officials with quasi-investigatory power to enforce
state laws regarding the maintenance of reserves, liquidity ratios,
legality of investments, and other features designed to protect cus-
tomers.74 England has had mandatory auditor appointment provi-
sions in its corporate statutes for some time. 5 Canada has had man-
74. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 122-23 (McKinney 1971); N.Y. INs. LAW § 29 (McKin-
ney 1966); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 4 (1972).
Only one state has adopted the European system of mandatory audits in its general corpo-
rate statutes. See MAss. Am. LAws ch. 156B, § 109A (1970). Section 109A requires an annual
statement of condition to be filed, which, in most cases, must be accompanied by a written
oath of the auditor. The section provides:
The auditor shall state that he has examined the statement of assets and liabili-
ties included in such report, that his examination was made in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards, and that in his opinion said statement
of assets and liabilities presents fairly the financial position of the corporation
as of the date thereof, in conformity with generally accepted accounting princi-
ples. The state secretary may in special circumstances, in his discretion, ap-
prove the inclusion of an auditor's statement expressing a qualified opinion or
no opinion of the statement of assets and liabilities taken as a whole, provided
the auditor states his reasons therefor.
Section 111 also mandates annual stockholder ratification of auditor selection. Id. § 111.
Under the federal securities statutes, section 32 of the Investment Company Act now provides
for mandatory ratification of auditor selection. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-31(a)(2) (1970). See generally
Hawes, supra note 63.
75. See Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38; Companies Act, 1967, c. 81. See also
F. GORE-BRowNE, CoiPAmEs (42d ed. 1972); L. GowER, THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY
LAW (3d ed. 1969); Pittendrigh, Accounting Practices and Disclosures in the EEC, TaI
AccouNrTA's MAGAZINE, Jan. 1973, at 14. For a discussion of liabilities under these statutes,
see Baxter, The Liability of Accountants and Auditors for Negligent Statements in Company
Accounts, 36 MODERN L. Rv. 42 (1973).
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datory appointment provisions in its general corporate statutes and
now is adding audit committee provisions. This legislation, in gen-
eral, requires annual appointment of auditors by the board and
ratification by shareholders. 7
In Europe's civil law countries, the mandatory auditor has been
in public corporate statutes for many years .7 The audit and attest
functions are much more limited than in the United States, how-
ever; the auditors are usually individuals rather than firms, and
they do not report on the fairness of presentation, but only that
statutory recordkeeping and reporting requirements regarding such
things as capitalization and reserves have been observed.7 If these
requirements have not been observed, the auditors can, and in some
cases must, report this to the authorities,79 and, in certain cases,
they can convene a special shareholders' meeting. The liabilities
of the statutory auditor are not spelled out clearly in all cases. The
76. See note 73 supra. See also Hawes, supra note 63, at 10-12.
77. See, e.g., CODE DE COAIERCE tit. IX, arts. 64-69 (1935) (Belgium); Loi Sur Les Societes
Commerciales (July 24, 1966) J.O. 6402 et seq. (France); Aktiengesetz, Einfuhrungsgesetz
zum Aktiengesetz, BGB1. I 1809, 1185 (1965) (Germany); C. Civ. §§ 2397-2409 (Torrente
1973) (Italy). See generally Kohler, The New Corporation Laws in Germany (1966) and
France (1967) and the Trend Toward a Uniform Corporation Law of the Common Market,
43 Tot. L. Rlv. 58 (1968). The Common Market statutes for a "Societas Europea" provide
for mandatory accounts and audit of these accounts. See Sanders, The European Company
on its Way, 8 COMMON M itKm' L. REV. 29 (1971); 1 CCH COMMON MARKmr REP. 1350,1391
(1974). See also Froker, Proposed Statute of a European Corporation, 8 J. Bus. L. 67 (1971).
78. See Kovarik, Le Commissaire aux Comptes et Le Wirtschafsprufer, in CoLL c oNs
HErsuS (Ed. Cujas 1971), for a discussion of the basic approach of auditors with respect to
the statutory requirements. See also Kohler, supra note 77. For a comprehensive review of
the modern requirements, see A. Tyra, Companies Laws and Financial Reporting (1971)
(Univ. Wash. Grad. School of Bus. Adm.) Of interest are the German requirements that
auditors report on a management summary of major interperiod changes in the financial
statements, id. at 7, and that dismissed auditors be present at subsequent shareholders'
meetings to be questioned, id. at 12. A management report also is required in France, id. at
26-31, and England, but evidently it need not be reported on by the auditor in the latter
country, id. at 56, where no "statutory audit" of a set of prescribed accounts exists. Id. at
66.
79. See A. Tyra, supra note 78, at 12, 31-32.
80. See id. at 31 (France); Hawes, supra note 63, at 4-9 (England).
81. In France, the Commissaire Aux Comptes (statutory auditor) performs the functions
set forth in the statute, but, curiously, he need not have any accounting expertise. He is
subject to an administrative tribunal, however, which, like the SEC, can revoke his license
and, unlike the SEC, can fine him for improper conduct. Every statutory auditor is civilly
liable only for neglect of professional duties, false statements, ill-considered valuations, or
insufficient checking. See A. Tyra, supra note 78, at 33. Tyra states, "[Tihe art of accounting
may have suffered in France because professional accountants have not been assigned a role
in the implementation of the law. The statutory auditors need not possess demanding profes-
sional qualifications, and they earn low, government-set fees for their audits." Id. at 66.
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European statutory auditor thus serves more as a policeman than
as a professional guide to disclosure.
It is difficult to evaluate the potential effectiveness in this country
of the concept of the European statutory auditor.82 European ac-
counting principles allow considerably more latitude to an auditor
than comparable principles in the United States. The public com-
pany in Europe usually has two boards: a supervisory board and a
management board. The former, with overall responsibility for the
quality of management and financial reporting, contains no man-
agement representation; the latter runs the company. Corporate
statutes require the statutory auditors to report to the supervisory
board.s3 This board, however, often is dominated by management
through banks and other financial institutions that have share-
holder voting power. 4 Thus the European auditors have a wide
range of statutory powers, but, as in this country, these powers
probably are not very effective against management where the qual-
ity of reporting is in issue. The need for this effectiveness, although
increasing, is somewhat less in Europe, because public share owner-
ship is less widespread than in this country. 5 More importantly, the
entire audit and attest function is much less discretionary than the
processes required of American independent auditors.8
Germany apparently has no comparable provisions. In England, public companies' financial
statements must be reported on by members of a nationally recognized institute of chartered
accountants. Id. at 49. The report must state that the financial statements give a "true and
fair view" of a company's operations and position. Id. at 57. Apparently, there is no statutory
provision imposing liability.
82. For a discussion of the applicability of the German corporate structure to this country,
see Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 80 HARV.
L. Rav. 23 (1966). For an update, see Vagts & Waelde, The Societas Europaea: A Future
Option for U.S. Corporations?, 29 Bus. LAW. 823 (1974). See also Roth, Supervision of Corpo-
rate Management: The "Outside" Director and the German Experience, 51 N.C.L. Rv. 1369
(1973); Schoenbaum & Lieser, Reform of the American Corporation: The "Two Tier" Board
Model, 62 KY. L.J. 91 (1973). Vagts and Roth both note that a major drawback of the German
system, also said to exist in the United States, is the inability to prevent management from
dominating "outside" directors and, ultimately, the mechanism of its own reappointment.
See also Van Gerven, Some Recent Developments in Corporate Law Within the Common
Market, 6 INT. LAW. 494 (1972).
83. For an analysis and comparison with the American situation, see Blumberg, supra note
71. Blumberg states: "So long as the 'public' or 'professional' director is without a consti-
tuency or an appointing agency with public influence, the extent of change of corporate
objectives will not be major." Id. at 558. For a different approach to the problem, see
Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 61 Gao. L.J. 71 (1972).
84. See Vagts, supra note 82; Vagts & Waelde, supra note 82.
85. See Hawes, supra note 63, at 7 n.34.
86. See Pittendrigh, supra note 75.
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The Need for Change
Publicizing disagreements with auditors through Form 8-K dis-
closure, use of audit committees, and statutory auditor provisions
all give more legal recognition to the major role of the auditor when
seeking improved corporate financial disclosure. It is doubtful, how-
ever, that these procedures will induce the profession to satisfy those
standards of performance that have been set by the courts, the SEC,
and the public, nor will the Trueblood Report's objectives be at-
tained. Indeed, these approaches may circumscribe auditors' free-
dom to exert their professional influence on clients in a confidential
setting, thereby reducing the available options when disagreements
arise. Moreover, these techniques do not affect the substantial in-
crease in liability exposure implied by the performance standards
being urged, and the use of such procedures also may raise expecta-
tions that the higher standards are being met before the profession
is equipped to meet them.
The inherent inadequacies of the techniques outlined illustrate
the need for reformers to concentrate on a dual objective: requiring
auditor's reports that will satisfy recently developed judicial and
administrative reporting standards, while fashioning liability rules
that shield from excessive exposure auditors who prepare these re-
ports in a professional manner. These goals could be met by modify-
ing existing state corporation laws,87 but several factors indicate the
difficulties of this approach, even if attempted through the Model
Business Corporation Act. First, state legislators, dependent on the
good will of corporate citizens, might be dissuaded from the task.8
Secondly, such action by state law might necessitate development
of a complete set of financial disclosure provisions essentially dupli-
cative of federal law, with a resulting regulatory complexity rivaling
that of state corporate taxation. Finally, because the affected state-
ments often emanate from companies whose activities are nation-
wide and because the statements themselves may receive nation-
wide dissemination, it would be preferable to deal with these prob-
lems by national regulation."
87. For a discussion of the Massachusetts corporate statute, see note 74 supra.
88: See Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117
U. PA. L. Rv. 861 (1969).
89. There is, of course, the alternative of a federal corporate statute. For a discussion of
the numerous difficult administrative problems with such a statute, see Symposium-
Federal Chartering of Corporations, 61 GEo. L.J. 71 (1972).
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A PROPOSAL
The changes needed to clarify the auditor's role must focus on a
revision of reporting ground rules, while placing clear statutory limi-
tations on liability flowing from the engagement. Although it is with
trepidation that any changes are suggested in reporting ground rules
and documents that have been tested so thoroughly in the crucible
of experience, the attempt is necessary because the courts and the
SEC persistently have mandated extending auditors' responsibili-
ties beyond the AICPA "fairness" concept. Paragraph 511 of the
AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards provides some guidance
in this effort:
An unqualified opinion that financial statements present fairly
financial position, results of operations, and changes in financial
position may be expressed only when the independent auditor
has formed the opinion, on the basis of an examination made
in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, that
the presentation conforms with generally accepted accounting
principles applied on a consistent basis and includes all inform-
ative disclosures necessary to make the statements not mislead-
ing. 0
The "fairness" formula thus might be rephrased to require financial
statements that include "all informative disclosures necessary to
make the statements not misleading." Requiring auditors to make
this express representation may well focus their efforts, and those
of the client, upon preparation of a presentation that will satisfy
developing legal doctrines."
90. CPA-SAS 511.01, at 80-81.
91. Controversy exists within the American profession about whether the auditor's phrase
"present fairly ...in conformity with [GAAP]" should be read conjunctively or disjunc-
tively. The former reading would be "fair GAAP are applied" or "GAAP are applied fairly,"
while the latter would read, for example, "GAAP are applied fairly and the financial state-
ments are fairly presented." See Rosenfield & Lorensen, supra note 10, at 74. Rosenfield and
Lorensen claim that a disjunctive standard will undermine the uniform application of GAAP.
Id. at 82. They note, however, that the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants has
required a disjunctive auditor's opinion for several years, thereby causing auditors to assume
responsibility for fairness of presentation generally as well as for adequate application of
GAAP. Id. at 77.
The practical value of this approach has been recognized for some time. As early as 1969,
the Wheat Report noted:
Where seriously misleading disclosures do occur [in the annual report to share-
holders] they are most frequently found in textual references made to, or con-
densed presentations of, the results of operations. . . .The Study considered
the possibility of requiring by rule that all financial disclosures in an annual
report to shareholders wherever located in the report, be reviewed by the audi-
[Vol. 16:71
1974] LIABILITY OF ACCOUNTANTS
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) seemingly
would be the best forum in which to implement this change. Con-
currently, the FASB and the SEC could consider the entire issue of
"qualified" versus "subject to" opinions in light of the proposed
change, for, if the Trueblood Report's intent has been determined
correctly, auditors reasonably should be called upon to be less cryp-
tic in their analysis of disclosure problems. Several cases strongly
indicate that a careful examination of disclaimers in the auditor's
report will be made to determine if disclosure responsibilities are
being met. 2 By.allowing the auditor to elaborate his concerns more
fully in the reports without risk of SEC rejection, he will be encour-
aged to speak in a manner more comprehensible to the average
investor.
tors for consistency with the certified financial statements and covered by their
opinion. The opinion would be required to state that the auditor has reviewed
such disclosures and that they are fairly based on the certified statements.
DiscLosuRE TO IvsToRs-A RAPPASAL OF AD nINSTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER '33 AND '34
SEcURIEs Acrs 369-72 (1969). This approach was cited with approval in Feit v. Leasco Data
Processing Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). William C. Norby, former Presi-
dent of the Financial Analysts Federation, analyzed the auditor's role:
The presentation of financial statements is the responsibility of corporate
management. The professional accountant attests as to their correctness. The
user and interpreter of these statements is the investor, or the financial analyst
acting for the investor. In theory, these parties have a common interest in
accurate financial statements. In fact, however, their immediate interests tend
to diverge. The resulting conflicts are at the root of some of the accounting and
reporting problems plaguing investors today ....
The public accountant is the man in the middle of this conflict. Thought by
analysts and other users to be the final arbiter of accounting questions arising
in a corporate financial statement, he is in fact responsive to the wishes of
management so long as they are within accepted accounting principles, which
are very broad. The accountant is retained by management, not by investors
(despite occasional formalities of stockholder approval). His attestation to a
financial statement is thought by users to reflect a fiduciary responsibility, but
in fact, it is a limited certificate. This misunderstanding of the extent of liability
of accountants in their attest function seems to be reflected in the growing
number of suits filed against accounting firms on grounds that certified state-
ments were misleading ....
The accounting profession can resolve its conflicting middle position by fully
assuming the fiduciary role that is being thrust on it anyway. Its certificate on
a financial statement is valuable to the issuer and therefore the accountant has
a point of leverage to secure adherance to new and stricter accounting principles
by his clients. The scope of the certificate might well be enlarged to include
financial data in the texts accompanying the statements and possibly, on some
basis, interim reports.
Norby, The Needs and Responsibilities of the Investor in Equities, in'SAvrMv I, supra note
11, at 95, 105-08.
92. See notes 28-48 supra & accompanying text.
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It is understandable that auditors are reluctant to accept changes
in the formal nature of their engagement and the representations
they make, for, as already documented, the profession is undergoing
considerable strain and uncertainty regarding the expansion of its
liabilities. Accordingly, a corollary of the foregoing proposed change
in the report would place some clearly understood statutory liability
limits on auditors' responsibilities arising from the engagement.
With the exception of cases arising under section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933, where damages are limited to the price of the securities
sold,9 3 most courts today retain a scienter requirement for auditor
liability to foreseeable, but not foreseen, persons based on an impro-
per report. 4 Contrary language in a few cases" probably can be
explained by the facts in those cases, since the errors were particu-
larly glaring or the plaintiffs were clearly foreseen beneficiaries of
the report at the time it was prepared.
Not all federal courts, however, require scienter as an essential
element of the plaintiff's case.2 Moreover, even where required, the
judicial notion of scienter does not rule out possible liability for
ordinary negligence if, for example, an auditor negligently fails to
make an adequate investigation in accordance with generally ac-
cepted auditing procedures, or qualifies his opinion in a manner
that negligently fails to reveal the details of concern in a manner
intelligible to investors. Such lapses can lead to a finding that the
defendant auditor was conscious that he had no adequate basis for
the statements made in his report, or even that he was conscious
that his report would be misleading to the average investor. This
expansion of the scienter requirement's parameters undoubtedly
will be increased as documents required by the Securities Exchange
Act come to include information of the type needed to satisfy the
Securities Act's provisions, thus allowing the resulting higher disclo-
sure standards to be enforced by rule 10b-5 actions.
In a sense, the cautious insistence on a scienter requirement in
93. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(g) (1970).
94. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973); Mader v. Annel,
461 F.2d 1123, 1126 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972).
95. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962).
96. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968); Stephens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379-80 (10th Cir. 1965).
97. See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 861 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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rule 10b-5 cases is an artificial attempt to limit liability. If these
limits were clearly secured by statute, it would be easier to develop
a standard of care to unforeseen third parties, at least in rule 10b-5
cases, similar to that applicable to auditors in their relationships
with persons in privity. This, in turn, would eradicate the need for
a strained definition of scienter, which would be limited to willful
or grossly negligent conduct entitling the plaintiff to punitive dam-
ages.
Accordingly, a desirable amendment to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 would set a specific damage limit on an auditor's liabil-
ity, such as "out of pocket" costs to the plaintiff. The proposed
Federal Securities Code" of the American Law Institute contains
limits on liability in civil damage suits that merit serious considera-
tion by the accounting profession; these provisions could comple-
ment the suggested revision of the form of the auditor's report.
The Code, which is expected to be ready for legislative presenta-
tion within the next few years, will contain nineteen parts that
consolidate existing federal securities statutes and rulings. In its
basic approach to corporate disclosure, the Code creates a system
of registering issuers rather than issues, mandates a regular report-
ing and disclosure system for those issuers, and sets forth the disclo-
sure conditions under which distributions of securities may be
made. " Part VI, entitled "Postregistration Provisions," and Part
XV, entitled "Administration and Enforcement," give the SEC au-
thority to require annual, quarterly, and other reports, including the
annual report to shareholders, and to regulate their content, as well
as the form and content of auditors' reports.10
The Code places several limits on potential auditor liability.
From section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,111 the Code adopts the
98. The Code thus far has been embodied in three tentative drafts, each issued by the
American Law Institute. ALI FED. SncuRrrms CoDE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972) [hereinafter
cited as Draft No. 1] basically covers registration of issuers (Part IV), offerings (Part V), and
reporting by issuers and insiders (Part VI). ALI FED. SECURrms CODE (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1973) [hereinafter cited as Draft No. 2] .essentially covers fraud, manipulation, and civil
liabilities for various violations (Parts XIII and XIV). ALI FED. ScunrrMS CoDE (Tent. Draft
No. 3, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Draft No. 3] primarily covers administrative enforcement
and general provisions (Parts XV-XVII), including selection of auditors. A general revision
of these three drafts is in progress and should be available in 1975. Further drafts then will
be made, mostly covering specialized areas such as investment companies.
99. For the Reporter's 1974 summary and prognosis, see Introductory Memorandum, Draft
No. 3, at XV. See also Loss & Blackstone, Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 28
Bus. LAw 381 (1973).
100. For an overview of the Code's general scheme, see Draft No. 1, at xiii.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1970).
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"due diligence" defense available to auditors in suits based on a
prospectus. Additionally, an overall damage limit is established
equal to the total market price of an offering. 12 In its most recent
version, the Code partially coordinates liabilities for misrepresen-
tation as they exist under the Securities Act and the Securities
Exchange Act, by imposing section 11-type liability on the issuer
and others, including auditors, for "misrepresentations" and omis-
sions of material facts in registration statements and annual reports
required to be filed with the SEC, other than the annual report to
shareholders. 10 3 The defenses provided are similar to those now
available under the Securities Act, and the damage limit, for all
practical purposes, is one hundered thousand dollars per individual
defendant.' The Code therefore would impose liability on auditors
for negligence with respect to prospectuses and SEC forms, but it
concurrently would place significant limits on exposure in civil
damage suits.0 5
102. Draft No. 1, § 601, governs the content and filing requirements of the reports; Draft
No. 3, § 1503, covers the SEC authority over the content of the auditor's report.
103. Draft No. 2, § 1403(a). This section does not apply to the annual report to sharehold-
ers, except to the extent that it reflects a deceptive act or a misrepresentation contained in a
filing otherwise covered by this section. See id., Comment (1)(b). Liability for misrepresen-
tation in other reports required to be filed, including the annual report to shareholders if the
SEC requires it to be filed pursuant to section 601, Draft No. 1, § 601, is covered by section
1404, Draft No. 2, § 1404, which is directed at issuers, including auditors who are "aiders and
abetters" under section 1418, Draft No. 2, § 1418. See Draft No. 2, § 1404, Comment (5)(b).
Section 1403(e)(4)(B), covering an expert's "due diligence" defense, applies to "any part
of the filing purporting to be made on his own authority as an expert. . . ." Draft No. 2, §
1403(e)(4)(B). This language, of course, tracks section 11 of the Securities Act. Both section
11 and section 1403 limit an expert's liability to statements which purport to be made by the
expert. Replacing the Securities Exchange Act's provisions, section 1304 of the Code bases
liability on a "deceptive act in connection with, or ... a misrepresentation in, a press release
or other form of publicity relating to an issuer. . . ." Draft No. 2, § 1304(c). The definitions
of the types of statements that are actionable here are very broad, and no comfort can be
derived from the Code's cautious approach to the difficult problems of causation and reliance.
See Draft No. 2, § 215A ("A loss is 'caused' by specified conduct to the extent that the
conduct (a) was a substantial factor in producing the loss and (b) might reasonably have been
expected to result in loss of the kind suffered").
Hopefully, the Code will recognize current cases that permit auditors to police their expo-
sure from the engagement by specifying those parts of their work that are not for public
exposure. See, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 169 (3d Cir. 1973) (SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862"(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), interpreted
to hold that rule 10b-5 liability extends only to assertions made "in a manner reasonably
calculated to influence the investing public ... by means of the financial media.").
104. Draft No. 2, § 1403(g), Comment (11)(d). The limit is one percent (up to one million
dollars) of gross income where the defendant has annual gross income over ten million dollars.
Draft No. 2, § 1403(g)(2)(B).
105. The proposed Code draws a sharp distinction between the proscription of unlawful
conduct, chiefly contained in Part XIII, and the delineation of damage liability in civil suits
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In other areas the proposed Code appears to include a concept of
scienter. Section 1406 imposes liability on any person who engages
in "a deceptive act in connection with," or makes "a misrepresen-
tation in . . .a press release or other form of publicity relating to
an issuer," where the violation is "known" by the defendant."'5 Evi-
dently, this section is intended to include annual and quarterly
reports to stockholders. In this area, the Code is not quite clear
regarding the auditor's specific areas of responsibility. Damages are
confined to the plaintiff's out-of-pocket loss, subject also to the one
hundred thousand dollars per defendant limit.01
The Code carefully provides in section 1418(b) 5 ' that a person
shall not be found to have "aided and abetted" another unless he
"substantially assists or induces" the other's conduct giving rise to
liability under the Code with "knowledge" or reasonable grounds to
believe that the conduct is a violation. This provision, as the com-
ments indicate, should be of significant help to protect auditors
contained in Part XIV. The SEC, when seeking a civil injunction or criminal penalties,
generally is not required to prove scienter, but only that a "misrepresentation" or a "decep-
tive act" has occurred. Accordingly, the Code will provide limits governing civil damage
recoveries only. See Draft No. 2, § 1404, Comment (1)(a).
106. Draft No. 2, § 1406(a). A "deceptive act" is described in the comments to section 225,
Draft No. 2, § 225, as an almost verbatim codification of the antifraud provisions of existing
federal securities laws. See Draft No. 2, § 225, Comment (1). The term specifically includes
acts that are "likely to deceive regardless of whether deception is intended." Draft No. 2, §
225(a) (3). This formulation would appear to allow court decisions, similar to those under rule
10b-5, that do not require scienter as a necessary elem6nt of a claim based on conduct toward
a foreseen class of persons. See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 229.30
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U1.S. 951 (1968); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379-80 (10th Cir.
1965); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961); cf. SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181, 185 (7th Cir. 1966).
Ellis and Royal Air have been overruled effectively by White v. Abrams, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 94,457 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 1974), which adopted a "flexible"
standard of duty. See note 39 supra.
A "misrepresentation" is defined in section 259, with the result that, as the Reporter notes,
"the scienter element (if any) is extraneous to the proscription of the unlawful conduct itself
. ." Draft No. 2, § 259(a), Comment (3)(c). The Code's current definition of "knowledge,"
contained in section 251A, Draft No. 2, § 251A, is to be rewritten to include only actual
knowledge of the matter, and a new definition is to be added for the term "scienter." Although
they probably do not represent a final answer, these changes should make it easier to follow
the manner in which traditional concepts of liability for misrepresentation have been adopted
by the Code.
107. Draft No. 2, § 1406(c), contains appropriate cross-references to sections 1402(0(1) and
1403(g)(2), which impose the liability limits. For discussion of the difficulties of determining
what portion of an auditor's work on an annual or interim report is actionable under section
1406(c), see note 103 supra. The auditor's legal responsibilities in this area are not as well
defined as they are under the Securities Act of 1933. See notes 33-36 supra.
108. Draft No. 2, § 1418(b).
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from "aiding and abetting" claims based on less than actual partici-
pation in the activity, since the commentary throughout numerous
civil liability sections of the Code applicable to issuers makes it
clear that those sections also will apply to "aiders and abetters. ' ' 9
While substantial revisions are in process, the proposed Code con-
tains many desirable features limiting auditors' liability, while ac-
commodating the expanded function of the auditor's report that has
been suggested.
CONCLUSION
As the law now stands, an auditor's responsibilities are not de-
fined clearly. Judicial opinions and SEC rulings evidence a trend
toward treating auditors in the exercise of their professional func-
tions much the same as others engaged in a joint disclosure enter-
prise. The objective is to get disclosure that is not, on the whole,
misleading to the average investor; auditors are just as responsible
for achieving this objective as any other person involved in the
process, regardless of the effect of devices that limit the scope of
their actual engagement. Furthermore, a trend can be discerned to
hold auditors and other professionals involved in disclosure to a
higher than normal standard of care, on the theory that because
they hold themselves out to the public as professionals, they should
have a duty of care- not to perform their function in a negligent
manner. While perhaps laudable in principle, in practice this trend
would seem to distort a wide variety of auditor-client relationships
and lessen the profession's effectiveness as a responsible servant of
business and the public.
If adopted, the proposals set forth in this Article should put the
auditors, the courts, and the SEC on notice that the auditor's legal
responsibilities are qualitatively no different from those of others
who make representations in securities transactions, but that
quantitatively they are different. Auditors should perform their en-
gagement prudently to avoid misleading a foreseeable plaintiff and
acknowledge publicly that the opinion issued with a financial state-
ment should assist in determining that the statement is not mis-
leading; they should be allowed as much space as they want to
express the specifics of their concern about financial statements.
Their exposure in damages, however, should be limited in some
manner which permits them to function without excessive cost to
109. See, e.g., Draft No. 2, § 1403, Comment (11)(g); id. § 1404, Comment (5)(b).
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themselves and their clients, for "risk spreading" probably does not
make sense where professional services are involved.
The profession is not trying to avoid its responsibilities; rather, it
seeks only to clarify them, to determine what representations should
be made in the report, what standards of disclosure should be set
for financial statements, what professional procedures should be
adopted to ensure that the representations and standards can be
upheld, and what costs to assign to the task. These are legitimate
matters of professional judgment, and it is certainly appropriate to
allow that judgment to work for the best interests of all concerned.
